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SOME REFLECTIONS ON DISSENTING
Honorable Kermit V Lipez1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the collegial world of appellate judging, where the dominant impulse is
consensus, dissents depart from the norm. If their language is sharp, the dissents
may offend colleagues and worry court watchers who expect consensus. These
self-assigned opinions also add to the pressures of the work.
Given these implications, the choice to dissent should never be a casual one.
You must weigh the institutional and personal costs and benefits, understand the
purpose of the dissent and the audiences for it, and always be attentive to style and
tone.
In a haphazard sort of way, I consider these issues when I write a dissent. But
doing a job over time can instill the dangerous notion that you know what you are
doing. You tend to ask yourself less pointed questions, and you are more likely to
make a mistake. I have now been an appellate judge for over ten years, first on the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court (Law Court) and now on the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.2 I wrote twenty-four dissents during my four years
on the Law Court. I have written fifteen dissents during my six and a half years on
the court of appeals. I have no idea whether these numbers are large or small. I
have not compared them with other judges, and I am not suggesting that I dissent
more than other judges. These numbers only describe my personal experiences
with dissenting. With more dissents in the offing, it is simply time for some reflec-
tions on what I have been doing.
I have reviewed some of the legal commentary on dissents and my own dis-
sents. On the basis of that reading, I have some information and observations on
dissenting that I would like to share. In doing so, however, I must extend an apol-
ogy to past and present colleagues. To make some of the points I wish to make, I
quote from my own dissents, sometimes approvingly. I also describe my view of
the case when I use these quotes. This approach is a bit unseemly and unfair. My
dissents were written in response to the majority opinions of exceptionally able,
fair-minded judges. My disagreements never diminished my respect and admira-
tion for them. But if readers want the rest of the story in the cases that prompted
my dissents, they will have to read the majority opinions of my colleagues. This
article is not about those cases. Instead, it is about the practice and process of
dissenting, with my own dissents as part of the inquiry. When cited, they are
offered as examples, not exemplars.
1. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. I want to acknowledge and
express my gratitude to my law clerk, Alana Hoffman, for her invaluable research and editorial
assistance in the preparation of this article and to my secretary, Anita Germani, for her excep-
tional skills in decoding my dictation and deciphering my handwriting. I also want to thank my
wife, Nancy Ziegler, for her perceptive comments on this article.
2. I sat on the Maine Supreme Judicial Court from May 12, 1994, to June 30, 1998, and
began serving on the First Circuit on July 1, 1998.
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1H. HISTORY
For better or worse, the United States Supreme Court is the model for many
appellate court practices. Hence, we can understand something about the history
of dissents in appellate court practice by looking briefly at the history of dissents
on the United States Supreme Court. In his frequently cited lecture on dissents, 3
Justice William Brennan traced some of that early history under the leadership of
Chief Justice John Marshall:
Until John Marshall became Chief Justice, the Court followed the custom of the
King's Bench and announced its decisions through the seriatim opinions of its
members. Chief Justice Marshall broke with the English tradition and adopted
the practice of announcing judgments of the court in a single opinion.... Una-
nimity was consciously pursued and disagreements were deliberately kept pri-
vate.4
Justice Brennan noted that "[tihis new practice ... was of great symbolic and
practical significance at the time .... [It] consolidated the authority of the Court
and aided in the general recognition of the Third Branch as co-equal partner with
the other branches." 5 Although Chief Justice Marshall's insistence upon unanim-
ity did not long prevail, 6 dissents remained the exception in Supreme Court prac-
tice well into the 1920s.
Indeed, a Canon of the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct,
on the books from 1924 until 1972, urged judicial restraint in the publication of
dissents: "It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort
should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion ....- 7
Judges were told that they should not "yield to pride of opinion .... " 8 Moreover,"except in cases of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle,
dissenting opinions should be discouraged." 9 As Linda Greenhouse, the Supreme
Court reporter for the New York Times, has written:
Canon 19 reflected the spirit of the times when the bar association adopted it.
During the 1920's, the Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice-
and former President-William Howard Taft decided more than 80 percent of all
its cases unanimously. Most dissents "are a form of egotism," the chief justice
wrote in a letter to Justice Willis Van Devanter, adding, "They don't do any good,
and only weaken the prestige of the court. It is much more important what the
court thinks than what any one thinks." 10
3. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986).
4. Id. at 432-33.
5. Id. at 433.
6. As Justice Brennan recounts, Justice William Johnson "issued a substantial concurrence"
in one of the first cases following his appointment in 1804. Id. at 434. Justice William Paterson,
who was appointed to the court in 1793, issued "the first true dissent from a judgment and
opinion of the Court" in 1806, and others began to follow. Id.
7. Linda Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Divided They Stand; The High Court and the Triumph
of Discord, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at 4-1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent,
Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MiNN. L. REv. 1267, 1311(2001)).
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With the Court under political attack in the 1920s:
lThe justices suppressed [their internal disagreements] for what they saw as the
institution's collective good. By maintaining a united front, the justices sought
to avoid giving ammunition to the court's political enemies, who could be ex-
pected to seize on a divided opinion as evidence that the court was making policy
rather than discovering the one true answer to a legal question. 11
However, a single event changed forever this "norm of acquiescence." 12 In
1925, the Supreme Court received from Congress its certiorari authority, giving it
the power to decide which cases it would hear from among those submitted for
review. 13 Now, "[t]he Supreme Court was no longer the court of last resort for
private disputes; the justices could turn down those cases to concentrate on legal
issues with broad national implications." 14 In other words:
The justices were not simply resolving particular disputes but superintending the
development of the legal system as a whole. This new focus in turn bolstered the
concept of law as an evolutionary process rather than a static set of rules to be
applied to particular facts and... made it less likely for justices to acquiesce in
decisions with which they did not agree.15
Justice William 0. Douglas summarized the import of this change in the law when
he wrote in an article in the 1940s that "[i]t is the democratic way to express dissi-
dent views." 16 He added that "[o]nly fascists and Communist systems insist on
'certainty and unanimity in the law.' 17
Statistics cited by Justice Antonin Scalia bear out the dramatic change in legal
culture resulting from the grant of certiorari authority to the Supreme Court:
One scholar has calculated that up until 1928 dissents and concurrences com-
bined were filed in only about fifteen percent of all Supreme Court cases. Be-
tween 1930 and 1957 dissents alone were filed in about forty-two percent of all
Supreme Court cases. [In the 1992] term, a dissent or separate concurrence was
filed in seventy-one percent of all cases. 18
When Justice Brennan delivered his lecture on dissents in 1986, he noted that of
the fifty-six opinions he wrote during the Supreme Court's previous term, forty-
two of them were dissents. 19 To be sure, that number reflected a dramatic change
in the philosophical direction of the Supreme Court. But that number also meant
that dissents had become an accepted part of Supreme Court practice. Indeed, the
very ordinariness of a dissent in Supreme Court practice reflected the Court's in-
stitutional self confidence. As Linda Greenhouse has put it: "The concern that
animated the earlier justices-that divided decisions might call into question the
legitimacy of judicial review itself-now seems quaint."'20
IL. Id.
12. See id. Greenhouse credits the phrase "norm of acquiescence" to Robert Post. See Post,
supra note 10.
13. See Greenhouse, supra note 7; Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 936-42 (1925).
14. Greenhouse, supra note 7.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 33, 35 (1994) (citations
ommitted).
19. Brennan, supra note 3, at 427.
20. Greenhouse, supra note 7.
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II. ONGOING DEBATE
Still, some of our greatest jurists have expressed skepticism about dissents.
Judge Learned Hand complained that a dissenting opinion "'cancels the impact of
monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely de-
pends."' 2 1 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked in his first dissent on the
Supreme Court that dissents are generally "'useless"' and "'undesirable.' ' ' 22 In
more recent years, Justice Potter Stewart labeled dissents as "'subversive litera-
ture. '"'23 As Justice Brennan has noted, these criticisms reflect the "paradox" of
the court, which is
[A]t once the whole and its constituent parts. The very words "the Court" mean
simultaneously the entity and its members. Generally, critics of dissent advocate
the primacy of the unit over its members and argue that the Court is most "legiti-
mate," most true to its intended role, when it speaks with a single voice. Indi-
vidual justices are urged to yield their views to the paramount need for unity.24
In my view, the fear that dissents undermine the legitimacy of an appellate
court reflects the misguided notion that the authority of the law depends on the
myth of the one right answer. How can we expect the public to respect the law, the
theory goes, when the judges cannot agree on what the law is? A partial answer to
that question is pragmatic. Justice Scalia has made the point well:
It seems to me that in a democratic society the authority of a bench of judges, like
the authority of a legislature, or the authority of an executive officer, depends
quite simply upon a grant of power from the people. And if the terms of the grant
are that the majority vote shall prevail, then that is all the authority that is re-
quired-for a court no less than for a legislature or for a multi-member execu-
tive.25
In other words, the rules are well known. The law is not some Platonic ideal.
In its authoritative sense, the law is what a majority of the judges on the appellate
court say it is. Acquiescence to the outcome in any given case does not depend on
the unanimity of the judges. Over time, however, our governmental institutions do
depend on the consent of the governed. That consent can be withdrawn if the
public questions the integrity of the process. They can abide disagreements among
their judges if they perceive that these disagreements reflect the conscientious ef-
forts of principled judges to resolve complex problems.
I think that the public is sophisticated about the unavoidable uncertainties of
the law. In a complex legal system such as ours, disagreements among judges do
not surprise anyone. What matters far more than unanimity among appellate judges
are the care and attention given by the judges to explaining their disagreements.
Indeed, the debate among judges on an appellate court, respectfully phrased, with
explanations that illuminate the disagreements, only enhances respect for the pro-
cess that produced the divergent views. I agree with Justice Scalia that "for the
21. Frank X. Altimari, The Practice of Dissenting in the Second Circuit, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
275, 276 (1993) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIoHs 72 (1958)).
22. See Brennan, supra note 3, at 429 (citing N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400
(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
23. Id.
24, Id. at 432.
25. Scalia, supra note 18, at 35.
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Supreme Court of the United States, at its current stage of development and in the
current age, announced dissents augment rather than diminish its prestige."'26 So
too with appellate courts throughout the country.
Indeed, there is no more dispiriting spectacle than a contrived unanimity re-
flected in a bland opinion designed to obscure differences and offend nobody. As
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes of the Supreme Court said:
[W]hat must ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the character and
independence of the judges. They are not there simply to decide cases, but to
decide them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be regrettable
that they cannot always agree, it is better that their independence should be main-
tained and recognized than that unanimity should be secured through its sacri-
fice. 27
As in all matters judicial, judgment counts. Some disagreements are trivial. Some
cases are more important than others. However, when the stakes are high and the
values are keenly felt, the appellate judge has a duty to dissent. There is no need to
apologize. There is only a need to do the job well.
IV. WHEN TO START WRITING
To do the job well, you have to start writing at a sensible time. After oral
argument and the ensuing case conference, you will know how you and your col-
leagues view the case. If you hold a minority view, you should begin to think
about dissenting. It would be premature, however, to return to chambers and begin
to write. First, there is an understanding that the conference decisions are always
tentative. The judge assigned to write the opinion might have a change of heart
after immersion in the record and the law. There is always the hope that your
colleagues may ultimately see the case your way. Second, it is difficult to write a
good dissent without a majority opinion before you. The debate between the ma-
jority and the dissent should illuminate the reasons for the disagreement. That
illumination cannot take place in a vacuum. Third, there is always the possibility
that you will be persuaded not to dissent by the authoring judge's opinion, which
may rely on facts in the record or reasoning not set forth in the briefs.
Despite the understanding that the conference decisions are always tentative,
the reality is that they usually stand. This was particularly true on the Law Court.
With seven judges generally participating in the vote rather than the three on a
court of appeals panel, the ship is simply harder to turn around, particularly if you
are the lone vote for a different outcome. Moreover, there is a common basis for
decision-making on the Law Court that a court of appeals panel does not have. On
the Law Court, cases are pre-assigned to a judge, who then has a clerk in his or her
chambers prepare a detailed bench memorandum that is shared with the entire
court. That memorandum reflects close examination of the record of the case by
the law clerk. This shared and detailed basis increases the likelihood that the deci-
sion at the conference will have a fixed quality.
On the First Circuit, there is no pre-assignment of cases. There, the presiding
judge of a panel (always the most senior active judge on the panel) assigns the case
26. Id.
27. Brennan, supra note 3, at 434 (citations omitted).
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at conference. Ordinarily, the record does not even go to a chambers until the
writing assignment has been made. Even though your view was the minority view
at conference, it is possible that the writing judge, having reviewed the law and the
record post-conference with your perspective in mind, might still agree with you.
Hence, it would be foolish to begin writing the dissent before receiving the draft
decision from the writing judge.
There is, however, one important caveat to this "wait and see" approach. On
both the Law Court and the court of appeals, there is an understanding that if you
decide to dissent, you must give that dissent priority over your other work. After
all, your dissent will delay the resolution of a case and the publication of an opin-
ion by your colleagues. It would be unfair to continue working on your assigned
cases while you write the dissent as time permits. Given that pressure to get the
dissent done, you might have your law clerks do some of the preliminary research
that will allow you to get a quick start on the dissent if the draft decision from the
writing judge indicates that the majority position has held.
V. THE AUDIENCES
There are multiple audiences for a dissent; those audiences differ between the
Law Court and the court of appeals.
A. Law Court
Your colleagues are your most immediate audience because they will be the
first to see your draft. Although the hope is a slim one, there is always a possibility
that you will change the mind of a colleague or two. If the vote at conference was
four to three, it only takes one convert to turn your dissent into a majority opinion.
That is not a fanciful possibility. From comments at the conference, duly recorded
in your notes, you might have seen that one of your colleagues was more on the
fence than others. It would be appropriate to draft some portions of your dissent to
appeal to that colleague.
For the reasons I have indicated, you will probably not have your dissent in
hand when you receive the draft of the majority opinion. Nevertheless, if you have
decided to dissent, you should advise your colleagues of that decision immedi-
ately. Although they may not defer taking a position on the majority opinion until
you circulate your dissent, they may, as a courtesy to you, cast their vote for the
majority opinion with the caveat that they will also look carefully at your dissent,
thereby reserving the right to change their minds. This courtesy at least preserves
the possibility of such a change.
This possibility is another reason for moving ahead with your dissent as expe-
ditiously as possible. The more a case recedes from the memory of your col-
leagues, the more difficult it will be to re-engage them in the case and win some
votes. For you, working on a dissent under considerable time pressures, the dis-
sent will be foremost in your mind, but your colleagues will have moved on to
twenty other items demanding their attention.
Your next audience, of course, is the parties themselves. If you have not been
able to convince your colleagues with your draft dissent, the losing party in the
case will at least have the satisfaction of knowing that a judge or two saw the case
their way. I have no way of knowing the value of this consolation to a losing party.
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After all, a loss is a loss. But I have occasionally chosen to dissent because I
wanted the losing party to have the consolation of knowing that at least one judge
saw the case their way. To be sure, that consolation does not justify writing a
dissent every time you disagree with an outcome. Indeed, it is one of the weaker
rationales for dissenting, particularly because of the danger of overdoing dissents.
You can become tiresome to your colleagues and dissipate the force of your own
voice if you are seen as a chronic dissenter who must always be heard. There are
times when you just have to "suck it up" and suffer in silence.
Then there is the legal community that follows the opinions of the Law Court
with some care and the broader public that may read about a case with high visibil-
ity. Within the legal community, there are already lawyers thinking about future
cases; your dissent may become the basis for a future argument to move the law in
the direction described in your dissent. In the broader community, where under-
standings of legal niceties may be less important than the public's sense of the
process at work, the debate between judges may reassure the public that thoughtful
and caring judges are engaging each other in a reasoned effort to reach a correct
answer. As I have already indicated, I think that these public disagreements, so
long as they are couched in the respectful language of civilized discourse, enhance
the prestige of appellate courts.
B. Court of Appeals
Of course, on the court of appeals, your audiences include your colleagues,
the parties, the legal community, and the larger public. Your colleagues, however,
are an audience in a different way, and there is another audience that is barely
noticed on the Law Court.
We sit in panels of three judges on the court of appeals. The party that loses
before the panel can petition for en banc review of the panel opinion-meaning
review by all of the active members of the court and any senior judge who hap-
pened to sit on the panel. 28 The filing of a dissent from a panel opinion virtually
assures that there will be a petition for rehearing 29 and en banc review. Knowing
of this likelihood, and of the attention that the dissenting opinion will receive from
non-panel colleagues who must vote on the petition for en bane review, you dis-
sent from the majority opinion of your panel colleagues with these non-panel col-
leagues in mind.
28. En bane rehearing may be warranted if it is necessary to "secure and maintain uniformity
of the court's decisions" or if the case "involves one or more questions of exceptional impor-
tance.... " FED. R. App. P. 35(b). In the First Circuit, "[r]ehearing en banc shall be ordered only
upon the affirmative votes of a majority of the judges of this court in regular active service who
are not disqualified, provided that the judges who are not disqualified constitute a majority of
the judges who are in regular active service." 1ST CuR. R. 35(a). Judges who have taken senior
status-that is, who have retained their offices but taken on a reduced workload under 28 U.S.C.
§ 371-may not vote on a petition for en banc rehearing but may participate in deciding the case
if they sat on the original panel. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1993 & Supp. 2004); see also Moody v.
Albemarle Paper Co., 417 U.S. 622, 627 (1974).
29. In a petition for panel rehearing, a party must "state with particularity each point of law or
fact that the petitioner believes the court has overlooked or misapprehended .. " FED. R. APP.
P. 40(a)(2). Based on the petition, the original panel may agree or decline to rehear the case. If
the panel agrees to rehear the case, that agreement may obviate the need for en banc review.
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In writing a dissent that is directed to your colleagues who were not on the
panel, you run the risk of winning by losing. That is, if you succeed in persuading
three of your colleagues besides yourself to vote for en banc review, both the ma-
jority opinion and your dissent are vacated and, in effect, they no longer exist. 30
Given the hard work that goes into a dissent, that victory comes with a pang.
For example, in Ellsworth v. Warden,3 1 I dissented from the decision of the
majority to grant the petitioner's request for habeas corpus from convictions in
New Hampshire for the sexual assault of a child. In effect, the majority's decision
meant that the petitioner would either get a new trial or be released from prison.
When I wrote that the majority had, in my view, "transformed unremarkable evi-
dentiary rulings into constitutional violations of such severity that... Ellsworth's
state court convictions must be vacated,"' 32 I wanted my non-panel colleagues to
understand the import of this decision for the many habeas corpus petitions we
receive from state convictions raising similar issues.
Oddly, there was no petition for en banc review from the state. Concerned
about the precedents set in the majority opinion, I moved sua sponte for en banc
review in a memorandum circulated to my colleagues. 33 That memorandum gar-
nered enough votes for en banc review. As a result, both the majority opinion and
my dissent were withdrawn, which essentially meant that the withdrawal was noted
in the West Law Reports and in the circuit's electronic docket. Oral argument was
then scheduled before the en banc court. The result was a new majority opinion
that adopted substantial portions of the reasoning in my dissent.34 Although the en
banc opinion provided for an evidentiary hearing before the district court on some
of the issues raised by the petitioner, rather than an affirmance of the district court's
decision dismissing the petition for habeas corpus review (the position that I had
taken in my dissent), I explained in a concurring opinion why I found this outcome
acceptable. 35 Frankly, I had hoped to undo the precedent established by the ma-
30. In the First Circuit, this disposition is "[iun accordance with customary practice." United
States v. Councilman, 385 F.3d 793, 793 (1 st Cir. 2004); see also, Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 2003) (en banc).
31. No. 02-1226, 2003 WL 203467 (1st Cir. Jan. 31, 2003), vacated en bane, 333 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2003).
32. Id. at *14 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
33. See Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 3 (1 st Cir. 2003) (en banc). The Supreme Court has
noted that although the parties may petition for en banc rehearing, "to hold that counsel are
entitled to speak to the en banc question, is not to hold that the court itself is in any way deprived
of the power to initiate en bane hearings sua sponte." W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co.,
345 U.S. 247, 262 (1953).
34. Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d at 2.
35. See id. at 8-9 (Lipez, J., concurring). I had concluded in my dissent that the government's
failure to disclose a note containing exculpatory evidence did not invalidate Ellsworth's convic-
tion under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the withheld evidence would have
been inadmissible at trial and thus did not meet Brady's materiality requirement. Ellsworth v.
Warden, No. 02-1226, 2003 WL 203467, at *23-24 (1st Cir. Jan. 31, 2003) (Lipez, J., dissent-
ing). On en banc rehearing, the court ruled for the first time that "the petitioner can also estab-
lish a viable Brady claim by demonstrating that withheld evidence, though itself inadmissible,
would have led directly to the discovery of material admissible evidence." Ellsworth v. Warden,
333 F.3d at 9 (Lipez, J., concurring). In light of that development, I agreed that "Ellsworth is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing" which would afford him the opportunity to demonstrate that
the withheld evidence would have led to the discovery of other material exculpatory evidence
and would allow the district court to further investigate the "nature and timing" of Ellsworth's
alleged knowledge of the withheld evidence. Id. (Lipez, J., concurring).
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jority opinion, and hence my primary audience for the dissent had been my col-
leagues. Although that dissent was now a relic without any decisional status, it
had served its purpose.
Even if the petition for en banc review is denied and the majority opinion of a
panel stands as the decision of the court of appeals, there is the real possibility of a
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. When the petition for
certiorari is reviewed at the Supreme Court by law clerks and perhaps even by
some of the Justices, the dissent will almost surely be reviewed as part of the
certiorari decision. Some dissents from court of appeals panel decisions include
specific appeals for Supreme Court clarification of areas of the law that divide the
circuits. Hence, the United States Supreme Court often becomes an important
audience for a dissent from a court of appeals panel decision. 36 Justice Scalia has
confirmed the reality of this audience: "At the Court of Appeals level, a dissent is
also a warning flag to the Supreme Court: the losing party who seeks review can
point to the dissent as evidence that the legal issue is a difficult one worthy of the
Court's attention." 37
VI. FUNCTIONS
Dissents perform a variety of functions. I identify some of those here.
A. Improving the Majority Opinion
If nothing else, a dissent usually forces the majority to rethink the reasoning
and assumptions that underlie its opinion. To be sure, the majority can choose to
ignore the dissent, hoping with such dismissive treatment to signal that there is
nothing in the dissent that requires a response. Although there may be times when
that view of a dissent is justified, those occasions will be rare. Ideally, a dissent
will improve the majority's opinion by forcing a response to the criticisms in the
dissenting opinion. Then readers have a better basis for assessing the strengths
and weaknesses of the competing arguments. Justice Scalia has written that "[t]he
most important internal effect of a system permitting dissents and concurrences is
to improve the majority opinion. ' 38 Drawing on his own experience, he notes
that:
The dissent or concurrence puts my opinion to the test, providing a direct con-
frontation of the best arguments on both sides of the disputed points. It is a sure
cure for laziness, compelling me to make the most of my case. Ironic as it may
seem, I think a higher percentage of the worst opinions of my Court-not in
result but in reasoning-are unanimous ones. 39
36. In the state court system as well, dissents on the intermediate courts of appeal are consid-
ered by the supreme court of a state in deciding those appeals. Justice Francis O'Connor of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") has written that "[t]he Massachusetts SJC looks
to the published opinions of the Massachusetts Appeals Court and especially to the reasoning
not only of that court but also of dissenting opinions. The SJC looks to the decisions and sup-
porting rationale of other intermediate appellate courts, including dissenters' views and reason-
ing as well." Francis P. O'Connor, The Art of Collegiality: Creating Consensus and Coping with
Dissent, 83 MAss. L. REv. 93,96 (1998).
37. Scalia, supra note 18, at 37.
38. Id. at 41.
39. Id.
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Not surprisingly, when Justice Scalia writes a majority opinion which is challenged
by a dissent, he does not withdraw from the contest:
[I]t is always within the power of the Justice writing the Court's opinion to dis-
avow the exaggerations and distortions of the dissent, and to make clear the pre-
cise scope of the holding. Which is one reason why it is my practice, when
writing for the Court, always to respond to the dissent, rather than to adopt the
magisterial approach of ignoring it.40
Frankly, there is less back and forth between the majority and the dissenter in
Law Court and court of appeals opinions than one might expect. Disinclined to
disturb the flow of their drafts with lengthy rejoinders, the authors of majority
opinions usually limit their rejoinders to footnotes. There is also some concern
that the debate might get too edgy, thereby creating unpleasantness that nobody
wants. Also, by the time a dissent has been written and circulated, everyone in-
volved in the case is feeling some fatigue. There is a desire to be done with the
case and move on. Still, even if the responses in the majority opinion to the dissent
are limited, those responses will almost surely clarify and improve the majority
opinion.
B. Damage Control
Improvement in the quality of the majority opinion is an unintended conse-
quence of a dissent. By contrast, damage control is an intended consequence.
Justice Brennan has written that the dissent is "commonly used to emphasize the
limits of a majority decision that sweeps, so far as the dissenters are concerned,
unnecessarily broadly-a sort of 'damage control' mechanism." 4 1
As such, the dissent is often, to use Justice Stewart's description, "subver-
sive ' 42 by design. Such dissents seek to erode the authority of the majority opin-
ion. I do not mean erosion in the institutional sense. The majority opinion must be
followed because it is a majority opinion. But if a dissent can weaken the persua-
sive authority of a majority opinion, it will make it more vulnerable to change in
the future. Also, a court of appeals dissent might deter other courts of appeals
from adopting the majority opinion, thereby preventing what Professor Cass
Sunstein has called the "precedential cascade, ' 43 when a precedent established in
one circuit quickly becomes a precedent in other circuits.44 A dissent from a deci-
sion of a court of appeals panel will increase the likelihood that the majority deci-
40. Id. at 38.
41. Brennan, supra note 3, at 430.
42. See id. at 429.
43. CAss R. SUNSTnN, WHY SocirEas NEED DIsSENT 59-60 (2003).
44. Sunstein explains that:
Especially in technical areas, courts tend to follow one another, sometimes leading to
errors. The reason is not that courts would feel so uncomfortable disagreeing with
other courts; it is that the predecessors might well be right, and agreement is the path
of least resistance.... Of course precedential cascades do not always happen, and in
the American legal system, splits among courts of appeals do arise. One reason is that
subsequent courts often have enough confidence to conclude that earlier courts have
blundered.
Id. (citations omitted).
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sion will receive critical scrutiny and perhaps eventual repudiation in another cir-
cuit.4 5 Justice Scalia has also noted this function of a dissent:
When a judge of one of our Circuit Courts of Appeals dissents from an opinion of
his colleagues, he warns the Courts of Appeals of the other twelve Circuits (who
are not bound by the stare decisis effect of that opinion) that they should not too
readily adopt the same legal rule. And if they do not, of course-if they are
persuaded by the view set forth in his dissent, pressed upon them by counsel in
some later case-a "conflict" among the Circuits will result, ultimately requiring
resolution by the Supreme Court's grant of a petition for certiorari. 46
In looking at my own dissents, I have identified two where damage control
was foremost in my mind. In Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop,4 7 a majority on
the Law Court held that the First Amendment barred any negligent supervision
claim against the Catholic Church. 48 This ruling of great import came in a case
that had been reported to us after the entry of an interlocutory order authorizing the
report. 49 Focusing the first part of my dissent on this procedural point, I empha-
sized the inadequate basis for setting forth such an important principle: "[W]e
have been loathe to decide constitutional issues on interlocutory report ... when
we have lacked the fully developed record that is often necessary to make the
difficult judgments required by constitutional cases." 50 After noting that the record
reflected the "possibility of a threat of harm known to the church but disregarded
by it," 5 1 I stated that "I think the court act[ed] prematurely in ruling out the possi-
bility of such a claim for harm ... regardless of the particular facts of the case."'52
In the face of the majority's broad statement that "[iut would.., be inappropriate
and unconstitutional for this Court to determine after the fact that the ecclesiastical
authorities negligently supervised or retained the defendant, ' 53 I tried to demon-
strate the inadequate basis for such a pronouncement in the hope of making the
opinion more vulnerable to reconsideration in the future. By sowing these seeds
of doubt, I hoped that the decision might not stand the test of time.54
45. Id. at 71 (praising judicial dissents because "they increase the likelihood that majority
decisions will receive critical scrutiny," thereby reducing the precedential cascade effect).
46. Scalia, supra note 18, at 36-37.
47. 1997 ME 63, 692 A.2d 441.
48. Id. 1, 692 A.2d at 442. The suit involved, inter alia, a negligent supervision claim
against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland based on the plaintiffs' allegation that their
priest initiated a sexual relationship with Mrs. Swanson after she approached him about remar-
rying her husband in a Catholic ceremony. Id. 2, 692 A.2d at 442.
49. Under the Maine court rules:
If the trial court is of the opinion that a question of law involved in an interlocutory
order or ruling made by it ought to be determined by the Law Court before any further
proceedings are taken, it may ... report the case to the Law Court for that purpose and
stay all further proceedings ....
ME. R. App. P. 24(c) (2004); see also ME. R. Civ. P. 72(c) (abrogated 2001).
50. Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 1997 ME 63, 16, 692 A.2d at 446
(Lipez, J., dissenting).
51. Id. 1 19, 692 A.2d at 447 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
52. Id. 19, 692 A.2d at 447-48 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
53. Id. T 12, 692 A.2d at 445 (quoting Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)) (internal quotations omitted).
54. Indeed, a recent decision by the Law Court limits Swanson's reach. See Fortin v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Portland, No. Ken-04-72,2005 WL 1027525, 1 29 (Me. May 3,2005) (hold-
ing that Swanson did not preclude a claim against the Church based on allegations that it failed
to report a priest's known propensity to sexually abuse young boys to law enforecement officials
and concealed the information from parishioners and the public).
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Similarly, in United States v. Beaudoin,55 a court of appeals search and sei-
zure case involving an anonymous tip, a motel room, and an order to the occupants
to leave their room, I felt that the majority had stretched some familiar constitu-
tional principles beyond all recognition in affirming the actions of the police offic-
ers on the scene. I stated this concern at the outset of the dissent: "[Tihe majority
adopts a novel amalgam of Fourth Amendment doctrines that combines the emer-
gency exception doctrine, the traditional exigent circumstance of risk to the safety
of police officers, and the Terry doctrine to uphold the officers' actions under the
Fourth Amendment."'56 In the balance of the dissent, I tried to explain the novel
application of these doctrines in the hope that future courts, including my own,
would be wary of using the decision as a precedent. In this entirely appropriate
way, I was writing a subversive dissent.
C. Future Law
If damage control is an immediate impulse for a dissent, there is also the hope
that the law of the dissent will eventually become the law of the jurisdiction. The
dissent "is made permanently available in the published reports for the instruction
of a succession of lawyers, judges and legislators, and it may do better later on.
The dissenter's view, therefore, retains a potential for influence through the years
.... -57 In the history of the United States Supreme Court, dissenting opinions
have eventually become the law on over 130 occasions. 58
However, Justice Scalia warns against excessive hope for such an outcome:
"Even the most successful of our dissenters-Oliver Wendell Holmes, who ac-
quired the sobriquet 'The Great Dissenter'-had somewhat less than ten percent
of his dissenting views ultimately vindicated by later overruling. Most dissenters
are much less successful than that." 59 Still, in some portion of his or her being, the
dissenter always believes in the possibility of future vindication.
D. The Call for Reform
Between the more immediate goal of damage control and the distant hope of
vindication, there is the call for reform that might move a court in the short term
when a similar case returns for consideration, or a legislature that is listening. This
possibility is particularly real in the state setting where the vastness of the federal
enterprise is not such an impediment to change. I wrote three dissents on the Law
Court that illustrate this call for reform in cases with recurring issues which could
return to the court before the passage of decades.
In State v. Ketchum,60 a seemingly unpromising dispute over the sufficiency
of the evidence, the majority's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction for theft was linked to a rule of law that, in my judgment,
made no sense. After observing Ketchum and his companions acting suspiciously
in his store, a figurines dealer noted the description and registration number of the
car in which they were riding and reported it to the sheriff's office. 6 1 Later that
55. 362 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2004).
56. Id. at 71-72 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
57. O'Connor, supra note 36, at 95.
58. SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 71.
59. Scalia, supra note 18, at 37.
60. 1997 ME 93, 694 A.2d 916.
6L. Jd. 3,694 A.2d at 917.
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afternoon, the police recovered stolen figurines in that car, where Ketchum was a
passenger. 62 The State had prevailed at trial, relying on the statutory presumption
that "exclusive possession of [recently stolen] property ... shall give rise to a
presumption that the defendant is guilty of the theft.., of the property .... 63 The
majority reversed Ketchum's conviction, explaining that Ketchum's presence in
the car when the stolen goods were found, in the absence of other evidence of
possessive acts, was insufficient to support the jury verdict. 64 Its reasoning was
based on some careless language in previous cases that added to the requirement
of proof of constructive possession a duplicative and unnecessary requirement that
there be proof of "other possessive conduct on the part of the defendant in relation
to the stolen goods .... 65 These types of theft cases are common in the trial
courts. It was reasonable to think that a case involving the same issue could soon
return to the court, which might then respond to the complaint in the dissent that
"[t]o require proof of other possessive acts independent of and in addition to the
constructive possession requirement makes no sense."'66
In Taliento v. Portland West Neighborhood Planning Council,67 there was a
background of discontent with our law on the termination of employment con-
tracts of indefinite duration. Here, I lamented our missed opportunity to change
the law:
I must respectfully dissent because the court's decision perpetuates the misappli-
cation of special rules of contract law to claims that an employment contract of
indefinite duration precludes at will termination. In my view, the record pre-
sented on Taliento's appeal provides an appropriate basis for revisiting our pre-
cedents in this area, reconsidering the extent to which an employment handbook
or personnel policy that purports to govern termination may constitute a binding
contract, and clarifying the principles of contract law to be applied in these em-
ployment cases.68
In the balance of the opinion, I tried to explain the history of misapplication re-
ferred to in the opening sentence, the new direction that our law should now take,
and how that new direction would apply to the facts of this case. In pursuit of the
theme of reform, I included a tedious footnote itemizing the law of "38 jurisdic-
tions [that] have recognized that implied employment contracts may be found on
the basis of language in employee handbooks and in other personnel policies that
restricts an employer's right to discharge an employee to particular reasons ('for
62. Id.
63. Id. 12, 694 A.2d at 918 (quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 361(2) (West 1983)).
In a footnote to my dissent, I quoted the Law Court's explanation of "exclusive" in another case:
Notwithstanding the fact that the term "exclusive" possession might, in ordinary us-
age, imply that a defendant must be in "sole" possession of recently stolen property in
order for the permissible inference to come into play, this [c]ourt has held that joint
possession of stolen property by two or more persons may be deemed the exclusive
possession of any one of them where there is evidence that the defendant "acted in
concert" with the other person or persons in possession of the property as a "partici-
pant in the crime."
Id. 19 n.6, 694 A.2d at 920 n.6 (quoting State v. Bachelder, 403 A.2d 754, 761 (Me. 1979)).
64. Id. 1 13, 694 A.2d at 918.
65. Id.
66. Id. 21, 694 A.2d at 921 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
67. 1997 ME 194, 705 A.2d 696.
68. Id. 14, 705 A.2d at 700 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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cause') or procedures for termination. ' 69 I also cited law journal articles that had
been critical of our treatment of employment at will contracts. 70
This dissent had some force, gaining the support of two colleagues.7 t Given
the slim majority for maintaining the old rule, the ferment for change within Maine
and the unmistakable trend in the law nationwide, there was hope that this call for
reform would not await the demands of future generations.
In State v. Spaulding,72 my dissent focused on a disagreement in the applica-
tion of statutory language criminalizing tampering with a public record. The de-
bate was over the meaning of the words "received" and "tampering." 73 The defen-
dant had been charged with tampering with public records based on her incorrect
representation on a Certified Nursing Assistant registry application that she had no
prior criminal convictions. 74 Under Maine law, the crime of tampering with pub-
lic records includes knowingly making "a false entry in ... any... document...
received.. . by the government." 75 Focusing on the words "tampering" and "re-
ceived," the majority concluded that a defendant could be convicted of the crime
charged only if she had altered an existing document that was already a public
record in the possession of the government, which was not the case here. 76 In my
view, that conclusion ignored the plain language of the statute and a basic prin-
ciple of statutory interpretation that "[n]o word in a statute may be treated as sur-
plusage if a reasonable construction supplying meaning and force is otherwise
possible."77 I thought "tampering" and "received" should have been interpreted
to render the statute applicable in cases "where [a] false entry is made on an appli-
cation for a government service, and the application with a false entry is then given
to the government." 78
This debate was not heart-stopping stuff. The dissent is almost mind-numb-
ing in its attention to the details of statutory language and ancient precedents. Still,
there was a possibility that this dissent might capture the attention of some pros-
ecutors and legislators who could see the importance of some clarifying statutory
language. Unlike the dissents in Ketchum and Taliento, where the focus was on
court-made rules which the court could change, the dissent in Spaulding focused
on the interpretation of statutory language. The interpretation of the majority would
control any future prosecutions unless the language at issue was changed by the
Legislature. Here, the call for reform was directed outside the court.
E. A Forum for Debate
In his article on dissents, Justice Scalia states that the issuance of majority,
dissenting, and concurring opinions by the Supreme Court Justices has
kept the Court in the forefront of the intellectual development of the law. In our
system, it is not left to the academicians to stimulate and conduct discussion
69. Id. 23 n.8, 705 A.2d at 704 n.8 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
70. Id. 23 n.9, 705 A.2d at 705 n.9 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
71. Id. 13, 705 A.2d at 700 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
72. 1998 ME 29, 707 A.2d 378.
73. id. 14, 707 A.2d at 381 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
74. Id. 1 2, 707 A.2d at 378.
75. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 456(t)(A) (West 1983).
76. State v. Spaulding, 1998 ME 29, 13, 707 A.2d at 381.
77. Id. 1 15, 707 A.2d at 381 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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concerning the validity of the Court's latest ruling. The Court itself is not just the
central organ of legal judgment; it is center stage for significant legal debate.79
Justice Scalia adds that this debate has "transformed [the Supreme Court's] reports
from a mere record of reasoned judgments into something of a History of Ameri-
can Legal Philosophy with Commentary. I have no doubt that this has contributed
enormously to the prominence of the Court and of the United States Reports. ' '80
Although it would be presumptuous to make comparable claims for the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions of justices on the Maine Law Court or judges on the
federal courts of appeals, I nevertheless know from experience that the majority
and dissenting opinions from those courts do find their way into the classrooms
and casebooks. I remember from my own law school days the pleasure of reading
the spirited debates in majority and dissenting opinions. These debates continue to
capture the intellectual excitement of the law.
VII. WHEN TO DISSENT
Although the discussion of the functions of a dissent suggest some of the rea-
sons for dissenting, the subject of "when to dissent" captures some considerations
that go beyond function.
A. Protest
Even if you will never see another case like this one, and even if there is
nothing for legislators or future judges to do, there are times when you must dis-
sent because you cannot abide the result. In Dasha v. Maine Medical Center,8 1 the
hospital had "misdiagnosed the severity of [the plaintiff's] brain tumor and sub-
jected him to massive radiation treatments, causing him to become incompetent
and unable to file a cause of action."'82 Nevertheless, for reasons that the majority
felt were unavoidable, the court applied the statute of limitations and concluded
that the case was an improper one for application of the doctrine of equitable es-
toppel. 83 At the outset of the dissent, I wrote that, "[h]istorically, the courts have
used equitable principles to ameliorate the harshness of the law."'84 I added that
the statute of limitations defense had been invoked "in a manner so unjust that the
Legislature could not have intended the result."' 85 I ended the dissent with a simi-
lar assertion, stating that the Plaintiff's "capacity for any degree of self protection
within the statute of limitations period was destroyed by the very party from whom
he seeks redress. The application of the statute in this case has no redeeming ratio-
nality."86
To be sure, the interplay between statutes of limitation and equitable prin-
ciples is often complicated. Courts cannot invoke equitable principles to avoid the
application of the statute when a legislative choice to the contrary is clear. But a
79. Scalia, supra note 18, at 39.
80. Id. at 40.
81. 665 A.2d 993 (Me. 1995).
82. Id. at 997 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 996.
84. Id. at 996 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Lipez, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 998 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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refusal to attribute to the Legislature an unthinkable application of the statute in a
rare case is consistent with institutional allocations of responsibility. Although
dissents that invoke such principles can seem annoyingly self-righteous to the
majority, there are times in dissent when indignation is the only choice.
Sometimes the protest is grounded in nothing more complicated than a sense
of fair play. In SC Testing Technology, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Pro-
tection,87 the Legislature had repealed a mandatory emissions inspection program
for automobiles after it became wildly unpopular in the State. 88 As a result of that
repeal, the State had allegedly breached a contract with the company that had in-
vested a considerable amount of money in establishing the facilities to carry out
the inspection program. 89 In the wake of that alleged breach, the contractor sued
the State for damages. 90 To my surprise, in the presence of what seemed a com-
pelling claim for breach of contract, the State was able to invoke the "unmistakability
doctrine" to win a favorable summary judgment ruling below and to persuade a
majority of the Law Court to affirm that ruling.91
In federal law, the unmistakability doctrine "recognizes a presumption that
when a sovereign government enters into a contract, it does not intend to limit its
ability to make its own performance impossible by means of a future sovereign
act."'92 A sovereign's power "'governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's ju-
risdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.' 9 3
Under Maine's version of that doctrine, "when a party enters into a contract with a
state agency, it does so with the understanding that the Legislature may at some
future time take action that nullifies the subject matter of the contract and, neces-
sarily, the respective performance obligations of the parties." 94 The majority had
used that doctrine to bolster its conclusion that the contract at issue expressed a
clear intention that SC Testing bore the risk of legislative repeal of the inspections
program.95 Viewing the language of the contract differently, I felt that we should
vacate the summary judgment and remand the matter to the superior court for
inquiry by a factfinder into the intent of the parties on the risk of repeal. 96 In the
long run, given the importance to a government of being a reliable contract part-
ner, I felt that "the State's interests are best served by subjecting it to the same
principles of contract law applicable to private parties. That application imposes
no undue burden. The State would simply have to rely on the drafting of clear
contract language, rather than legal presumptions, to protect its interests." 97
In both Dasha and SC Testing, I was not joined by any of my colleagues in
dissent. I do not cite that fact boastfully. Indeed, the fact that I was not able to
persuade my able, fair-minded colleagues of the rightness of my views surely gave
87. 688 A.2d 421 (Me. 1996).
88. Id. at 422.
89. Id. at 423.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 424-25.
92. Id. at 426 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Lipez, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrap-
ment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)).
94. Id. at 424.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 427 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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me some pause about the grounds of my dissent. For these occasions that oft-used
phrase "the lonely dissent" seems appropriate. However, if the moment of doubt
passes, and the indignation is still there, you should dissent.
B. Constitutional Issues
In reviewing my fifteen dissents on the court of appeals, I find that a substan-
tial majority of them involve constitutional law issues. This is not a great surprise.
The Constitution consists of glorious generalities. They are invoked by parties
sparring over some of our most divisive social and political issues. Our decisions
affect what government officials, including police officers, can and cannot do to us
or for us. With so much at stake in these constitutional cases, and with so much
room for disagreement, dissents are inevitable.
Interestingly, in writing about dissents in constitutional cases on the United
States Supreme Court, Justice Scalia has observed that "the doctrine of stare deci-
sis is less rigorously observed" in such constitutional cases. 98 By contrast, he
observes that "in cases involving statutory law, rather than the Constitution, we
will almost certainly not revisit the point, no matter how closely it was decided." 99
Although the courts of appeals are not in the business of altering the constitutional
principles announced by the Supreme Court, we are in the business of trying to
apply those principles in situations where the right application is not always clear.
Given the willingness of the Supreme Court to revisit constitutional doctrine, there
is all the more reason for judges on the courts of appeals to register their dissents in
these constitutional cases.
C. Consolation Prize
In any appellate court, if your disagreement with colleagues involves the ap-
plication of law to the particular facts of the case, your dissent will have little or no
resonance beyond that case. On the court of appeals, if you disagree with your
colleagues on a point of state law, there is usually no good reason to dissent since
the state courts can disregard anything the federal courts say about their law.1° °
Therefore, in a diversity case before the court of appeals, where the heart of the
disagreement is the application of state law to the facts of that case, there is almost
no justification for a dissent. Yet this coldly practical analysis leaves out the pos-
sibility of a consolation prize for the losing party in such a diversity case. I have
already alluded to this rationale in discussing the audiences for a dissent. There
are simply times when you feel so strongly about the wrongness of an outcome
that you want the losing party to know it.
98. Scalia, supra note 18, at 38.
99. Id. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have particular
strength... where 'the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what
we have done."' Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700 (1992) (citations omitted). In
other words, congressional inaction in response to the Court's interpretation of a statute is treated
as an implicit ratification of that construction.
100. In cases based on the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1993),
the federal courts apply state substantive law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938) ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the State."). However, because "[it is well settled that the
interpretation of a state statute is for the state court to decide," state courts are not bound by a
federal court's interpretation of state law. Salemme v. Ristaino, 587 F.2d 81, 87 (1st Cir. 1978).
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For example, in Seaboard Surety Co. v. Town of Greenfield,10 1 there was a
dispute between a school district and a surety company over the obligation of the
surety to complete a project after the contractor defaulted. The case turned on the
application of Massachusetts law for the provision of notice to a surety that its
obligations must be performed. There were millions of dollars at stake in this
litigation. 102 The dispute had been a nightmare for local school board members
trying to do their thankless job. I felt strongly that the district court's summary
judgment ruling in favor of the surety company overlooked communications be-
tween the school district and the company that might have permitted a jury apply-
ing the concept of reasonable notice to find in favor of the school district. 10 3 I
could not understand how the district court or our court, consistent with the re-
quirements of summary judgment, could dispose of this case and thereby prevent a
jury from performing a quintessential jury function. Although I understood that
the majority's opinion did not bind the Massachusetts courts in future cases, and
that my colleagues would have no interest in en banc review of a dispute involving
the application of state law to the facts of the case, I nevertheless wrote a dissent
explaining my disagreement with the majority's application of summary judgment
principles. This case would be news in the small town that had lost the case. I
thought that the school officials should be able to defend their actions by noting
that one judge saw some merit in their position. Saved for such occasions, there is
a place for these dissents.
D. Waste Not
Here I must confess to a less laudable motive than consoling the losing party.
As I have mentioned, the decisions reached at conference are always tentative. If
you have been assigned to write the opinion on the basis of a likely outcome, you
still have a right to reach a different conclusion after your immersion in the record
post-conference. Similarly, your colleagues retain their right to adhere to their
original view of the case and reject your draft. When that happens, one of your
colleagues will take over the case and write a decision that is contrary to your
initial draft, which is now available to you as a dissent if you want to dissent. Is
this a difficult decision? Not usually. Why waste all of that hard work and good
material? You easily convince yourself that the world needs to know your better
view of the case. There are one or two unnamed dissents out there that owe their
existence to this thinking.
E. Unbowed
On a variation of the "waste not" theme, I have written two dissents that had a
public, though brief, life as majority opinions before they became dissents. In
McCambridge v. Hall,104 1 wrote for a unanimous panel to vacate the decision of
the district court and grant the defendant's habeas corpus petition. 105 In Chestnut
101. 370 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 2004).
102. The cost of completing the project after the contractor's default was estimated at $3.8
million more than the contract funds remaining at the time. id. at 217.
103. Id. at 225-26 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
104. No. 00-1621, 2001 WL 1097770 (1st Cir. Sept. 21, 2001), vacated by 303 F.3d 24 (lst
Cir. 2002).
105. See id.
2005]
v. City of Lowell, 106 1 wrote for a divided panel to affirm the decision of the district
court awarding $500,000 in punitive damages against a municipality 10 7 even though
such punitive damages were not available as a matter of law under Supreme Court
doctrine. 10 8 Both of those decisions produced petitions for en banc review, votes
by my colleagues for en banc review (with the resulting withdrawal of the panel
opinions), and an ultimate rejection by the en banc court of the positions that I had
taken in the panel opinions. 10 9 For me, the only consolation (and a small one at
that) was to recast my original panel opinions as dissents from the decisions of the
en banc court, thereby permitting me to keep the viewpoints expressed in those
original panel opinions on the books. Absent a complete change of heart as a
result of the en banc process,I1 0 it would be strange for the author of the panel
opinion to resist recasting the original panel opinion as a dissent from the decision
of the en banc court. Such silence would betray an odd lack of conviction.
E Remembering Where You Came From
After I was nominated to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in 1994, 1 was
told repeatedly by my colleagues on the superior court-"Always remember where
you came from." This was more than a plea for humility. They wanted me to
remember the difficult work of the trial court, particularly when it comes to
factfinding, and all of the times that we had groused together about the inability of
the Law Court to understand what we do.
106. Nos. 00-1840, 00-1996, 2002 WL 483557 (1st Cir. Mar. 29, 2002), vacated by 305 F.3d
18 (1st Cir. 2002).
107. See id.
108. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (holding that munici-
palities are immune from punitive damages in federal civil rights suits brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). In Chestnut, the City failed to object when the district court mistakenly instructed the
jury that it could award punitive damages against any defendant, including the City, under §
1983. 305 F.3d at 19. Only after the district court had entered a judgment of $500,000 in
punitive damages against it did the City assert that such damages were barred by City of New-
port. The City moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, to strike the damages. Id. The district
court rejected the City's motion on the grounds that it had waived its immunity by failing to
timely object. Id. at 19-20. 1 agreed with this rationale, asserting that "we must affirm the jury's
verdict unless we conclude that allowing the punitive damages award to stand would constitute
a 'miscarriage of justice[,]"' a standard not met here. Id. at 25 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
109. See McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc); Chestnut v. City of
Lowell, 305 F.3d at 18.
110. 1 had such a change of heart once. In United States v. Kenrick, I authored both the panel
decision, No. 98-1282 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2000) (withdrawn)) and the subsequent en banc deci-
sion, 221 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2000). Although both decisions affirmed the defendants' convictions
for bank fraud, the en banc decision repudiated much of the reasoning in the panel decision, as
I explained:
The panel that first considered this case agreed with the defendants that intent to
defraud necessarily includes an "intent to harm" the bank, and that the district court
erred by omitting this requirement from its jury instructions. The panel further held
that there was no plain error. After further consideration of the intent issue [with the
benefit of supplemental briefing], the en bane court, including the panel members,
arrives at a different conclusion about the meaning of intent to defraud. We now hold
•.. that the intent necessary for a bank fraud conviction is an intent to deceive the
bank in order to obtain from it money or other property.
United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d at 26-27. I asked to write this opinion for the en banc court
believing that I could do a better job of repudiating myself than anyone else.
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I got that message. In Edwards v. State, I 11 a post-conviction case heard within
months of my joining the Law Court, the defendant claimed that the court had
improperly accepted his guilty plea when he did not have adequate knowledge of
the elements and consequences of the crime to which he pled.1 12 The post-convic-
tion trial court agreed, explaining that it did not have to rely on the defendant and
defense counsel's "faded memories" presented at the post-conviction hearing be-
cause it had the transcript of the actual plea hearing before it.113 The majority
interpreted this statement as a refusal to consider evidence presented at the post
conviction hearing. 114 In my first dissent on the Law Court, I wrote that "[r]ather
than ignoring the testimonial evidence, as the Court concludes, the trial court was
simply characterizing its poor quality. That was its judgment to make as the
factfinder." 1 15 I suspect that I heard my former colleagues whispering in my ear
as I wrote those words.
To demonstrate that this sensitivity to the trial court was not a passing fancy, I
later wrote a dissent in State v. Berube, 116 where the majority vacated a conviction
for Class A manslaughter because of its conclusion that the trial court had commit-
ted obvious error by failing to instruct the jury on a statute providing that death
arising from vehicular accidents involving speeds of less than thirty miles per hour
over the speed limit would be Class B manslaughter (as opposed to Class A man-
slaughter for higher speeds). After assessing the conduct of defendant's trial coun-
sel, I concluded that the defendant had waived the right to instruction on this man-
slaughter theory with a deliberate trial strategy.117 Specifically, I believed that the
defendant had adopted an "all or nothing" strategy in which the jury would con-
sider only two possible verdicts: guilty of Class A manslaughter or not guilty. That
allowed the defendant to argue that any uncertainty over whether the prosecution
had shown that he was traveling more than thirty miles per hour over the speed
limit, as required for a Class A conviction, should result in an acquittal. But if the
jury had also been instructed on Class B manslaughter, "uncertainty over the
defendant's speed would only push the jury toward a sure compromise" on that
verdict, rather than an acquittal. 118
The differing views in this case turned on how one read the record. As I saw
it, defense counsel's decision not to raise an available defense was not "so obvi-
ously wrong and manifestly unreasonable that the trial judge's accedence to the
defendant's wishes resulted in substantial injustice to the defendant."119 Indeed, I
thought that defense counsel had lured the judge into an instruction that the major-
ity now deemed obvious error. Again, I was remembering where I came from.
G. Blood in the Neck
In the end, perhaps the most useful test for deciding when to dissent came
from my colleague on the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, former Chief Justice
111. 645 A.2d 611 (Me. 1994).
112. See ME. R. CRIM. P. 11.
113. Edwards v. State, 645 A.2d at 612.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 613 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
116. 669 A.2d 170 (Me. 1995).
117. id. at 173-74 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 174 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 175 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Daniel Wathen. In his usual colorful, on-the-mark way, the Chief Justice told me
that, "I wrote a dissent when the blood rushed to my neck. I published the dissent
either when someone joined me or the blood remained in my neck." Passion al-
ways matters. Whatever the specifics of the case, a dissent is hard work. If your
passions are not engaged, you will not endure the burden of writing another opin-
ion. 120
VII. CARING ABOUT HERRING: WAS IT REALLY WORTH IT?
If it is important to know when to dissent, it is also important to know when
not to dissent. Having reviewed some of my dissents on the Law Court, I find
myself asking why I cared so much. For example, in SST & S, Inc. v. State Tax
Assessor,12 1 I dissented in a case involving the refusal of the state tax assessor to
exclude from a use tax assessment certain personal property used in the processing
of herring. In a display of unintentional irony or defensiveness, I wrote:
[T]he narrow question presented by this appeal is whether the Assessor could
have rationally concluded that SST & S had failed to establish that its ice-making
equipment and totes were used "directly" in "an operation or integrated series of
operations ... which transforms or converts personal property... into a different
form, composition or character." 12 2
This was indeed a narrow question. Yet I felt strongly enough about the issue to
end the dissent with a parting shot: "The Assessor's construction is an impermis-
sible gloss on a statutory definition of production that by its terms describes a
concept of production involving an integrated series of operations." 123 The moral
of the story is obvious-beware of assessors and appellate judges with a weakness
for impermissible glosses.
What was I thinking? The only meaningful audience for this dissent was my
colleagues; I can understand that I might have wanted to make the case to them for
an alternative outcome. However, when only one of my colleagues was willing to
120. With his characteristic good sense and elegant expression, my colleague, Judge Frank
M. Coffin, in his book On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering, and Judging, offers a particularly useful
distillation of the grounds for dissenting. They are as follows:
1. When the dissenter feels that a serious mistake of law has been made on a signifi-
cant issue that is likely to recur ....
2. When all the judges on the panel feel that the issue is close and that a dissent will
sharpen the focus and reflect the closeness ....
3. When the dissenter feels that her panel colleagues have erred as to thefacts... or
erred as to procedure ....
4. When the dissenter feels strongly enough about the injustice of a rule or precedent
that he wishes to send a signal to bench and bar, the state courts, the legislature, the
law schools, and commentators underscoring the inequity, anomaly, or inconsistency
and calling for change.
5. When the dissenter feels strongly enough about the conduct of the judges or law-
yers involved in the case to issue her own warning to the prosecutor, plaintiff's or
defense counsel, or trial court.
FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: CouRTs, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 227-28 (1994).
121. 675 A.2d 518 (Me. 1996).
122. Id. at 522 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Assessor's
conclusion meant that SST & S's ice-making equipment and totes were subject to a use tax; if he
had found that these materials were used "directly" in the production of processed herring, they
would have been exempt from the tax.
123. Id. at 522 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 57:2
SOME REFLECTIONS ON DISSENTING
join me,124 1 probably should have canned the idea of publishing a dissent. Sure,
the losing business might have found consolation in the dissent, but this case did
not involve the kind of pain or stakes that makes such a rationale compelling.
Oddly, at least to me, I wrote four dissents in cases involving assessments of
real and personal property.125 Rereading those dissents from some distance, I find
myself again wondering why I cared so much. Yet in each of those cases I was
joined by one of my colleagues, 126 suggesting that my view of the law was not
eccentric. The financial stakes in these cases were significant. There is an ongo-
ing tug of war between governmental bodies short of money and citizens who are
wary about fair treatment at the hands of government. The participation by judges
in some of the legal issues underlying this debate may have been worthwhile. In-
deed, in each of these tax cases some larger principles were at stake and hence the
discussion was relevant to future cases. 127
Those larger principles, however, are difficult to discern in cases such as Frank
v. Manpower Temporary Services,128 where I disagreed with the majority's calcu-
lation of the average weekly wage for a seasonal worker, or Wheeler v. White, 129
124. For information of no particular value, I offer the following summary of dissenting
alliances on the Maine Supreme Court. I dissented alone seven times, was joined by one other
justice fifteen times, and two other justices two times. Justices Robert Clifford and Howard
Dana each joined me five times in dissent; Justice Paul Rudman joined me three times, and
Justices Caroline Glassman, David Roberts, and Chief Justice Wathen each joined me twice. I
defy anyone to find an ideological pattern in these numbers. Wheeler v. White, 714 A.2d 125,
128 (Me. 1998) (dissent joined by Dana, J.); State v. Spaulding, 707 A.2d at 381 (dissent joined
by Clifford, J.); Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 705 A.2d at 700 (dis-
sent joined by Roberts, J. and Dana, J.); State v. Ketchum, 694 A.2d at 919 (dissent joined by
Roberts, J.); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d at 445 (dissent joined by
Dana, J.); Frank v. Manpower Temp. Servs., 687 A.2d 623, 626 (Me. 1996) (dissent joined by
Clifford, J.); State v. Stade, 683 A.2d 164, 167 (Me. 1996) (dissent joined by Dana, J.); Weekley
v. Town of Scarborough, 676 A.2d 932, 934 (Me. 1996) (dissent joined by Wathen, C.J.); Sea-
shore Performing Arts Ctr. v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 676 A.2d 482, 486 (Me. 1996) (dis-
sent joined by Clifford, J.); SST & S, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 675 A.2d at 522 (dissent joined
by Clifford, J.); Guardianship of Boyle, 674 A.2d 912, 915 (Me. 1996) (dissent joined by
Glassman, J., and Rudman, J.); State v. Berube, 669 A.2d at 173 (dissent joined by Clifford, J.);
IBM Credit Corp. v. City of Bath, 665 A.2d 663, 665 (Me. 1995) (dissent joined by Rudman, J.);
LaRochelle v. Crest Shoe Co., 655 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Me. 1995) (dissent joined by Wathen,
C.J.); Sinclair v. Sinclair, 654 A.2d 438, 441 (Me. 1995) (dissent joined by Dana, J.); Cent. Me.
Power Co. v. Town of Moscow, 649 A.2d 320, 326 (Me. 1994) (dissent joined by Rudman, J.);
Edwards v. State, 645 A.2d at 612 (dissent joined by Glassman, J.).
125. Weekley v. Town of Scarborough, 676 A.2d at 934; SST & S, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor,
675 A.2d at 522; IBM Credit Corp. v. City of Bath, 665 A.2d at 665; Cent. Me. Power Co. v.
Town of Moscow, 649 A.2d at 326.
126. Weekley v. Town of Scarborough, 676 A.2d at 934; SST & S Inc. v. State Tax Assessor,
675 A.2d at 522; IBM Credit Corp. v. City of Bath, 665 A.2d at 665; Cent. Me. Power Co. v.
Town of Moscow, 649 A.2d at 326.
127. In Weekley v. Town of Scarborough, that principle was adherence to our precedent. See
676 A.2d at 935 (Lipez, J., dissenting). SST & S Inc. v. State Tax Assessor dealt with an alleged
conflict between a rule imposed by the state tax assessor and the statute that the rule purported to
clarify. See 675 A.2d at 524 (Lipez, J., dissenting). IBM and Central Maine Power Co. both
involved a dispute over the proper methods of valuation. See IBM Credit Corp. v. City of Bath,
665 A.2d at 665-66 (Lipez, J., dissenting); Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Town of Moscow, 649 A.2d
at 326-28 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
128. 687 A.2d 623 (Me. 1996).
129. 1998 ME 137, 714 A.2d 125.
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where the issue was whether the court's erroneous jury instructions on the issue of
causation had so prejudiced the appellant that the instruction constituted reversible
error. The discussions in those cases were so fact bound that those dissents could
not be of interest to anyone other than the parties. Not surprisingly, those dissents
have never been cited anywhere. I have to question the wisdom of writing them.
At least they were mercifully short. 130
Dissents also have diminished value when the majority affirms the decisions
at issue without addressing the issues that are the focus of the dissent. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Salimonu,131 a drug prosecution involving a search and
seizure issue, I focused my dissent on whether a woman had actual or apparent
authority to consent to a search of the defendant's apartment. 132 Believing that the
district court had been wrong in its consent analysis and that the case raised impor-
tant issues about the consent doctrine developed by the United States -Supreme
Court, I thought that the wrong outcome and the larger issues merited the dissent.
Although my colleagues disagreed with my analysis of the consent issue, they saw
no need to address it. In their view, any error of the district court in its consent
ruling was harmless because of the strength of the other evidence in the case. I
disagreed with that position as well. 133
Regrettably, however, the majority and I joined issue only on the case-specific
harmless error analysis. On the far more important consent issue, I had the field to
myself. Although that might seem a desirable circumstance, it greatly reduced the
value of the dissent. Also, the harmless error debate meant that there was no chance
for en banc review. 134
Similarly, in Wills v. Brown University,135 a Title IX sex discrimination case,
I had concluded that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence that the
plaintiff had offered to prove her claim that Brown University failed to respond
adequately to a hostile education environment created by a professor's assault on
her and by his continuing presence in the classroom after the assault. 136 My col-
leagues felt that the appellant had never raised this issue adequately in her opening
brief and hence had .waived any right to argue it on appeal. 137 Therefore, in going
forward with my dissent, I had to spend considerable time at the outset explaining
why the appellant had not waived this critical issue on appeal. 138 Then, in the
balance of the lengthy dissent, I explained why the excluded evidence was rel-
evant. 139 To be sure, that explanation required me to explore some important
issues about the nature of hostile environment sex discrimination in a university
130. My Law Court dissents were generally short, averaging 3 pages in the West Law Re-
ports. The court of appeals dissents have been much longer, averaging 12.8 pages.
131. 182 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 1999).
132. Id. at 75-77 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 81 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
134. The harmless error analysis was not, in and of itself, an important enough issue to merit
en banc review (it almost never is), and there would have been no reason to reconsider the
consent issue in light of the panel's conclusion that even if the district court was incorrect in its
consent ruling, any such error did not affect the outcome of the case.
135. 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999).
136. Id. at 31 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 27.
138. See id. at 31-35 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
139. See id. at 36-40 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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setting and proof relevant to such a claim. 140 Unfortunately, however, I once again
had the field to myself. This one-sided exploration greatly reduced the value of
the analysis, and once again assured that there would be no en banc review.
Remembering how much work went into these lengthy dissents, understand-
ing the limited persuasive value of a dissent under the best of circumstances, and
knowing as I did that there was no chance of en banc review in those cases, I have
to question the value of these efforts. 14 1 Frankly, I wish for such occasions that a
simple statement "I dissent" were acceptable. Such unexplained statements of
dissent, however, are not considered acceptable, and for good reason. The parties
and the public deserve explanations so that they can make judgments about the
work of their judges. 142
IX. FRAMING THE ISSUE
Inescapably, the dissenter has the burden of justifying the decision to dissent
by crystalizing the disagreement with the majority and conveying the stakes in the
debate. There are different ways of doing this. One technique involves quoting
directly from the majority opinion and then using that quote to advantage. For
example, in Sinclair v. Sinclair, 143 a case involving a dispute over the retroactive
application of legislation altering the statutory right to cure defaults in mortgage
documents, the majority had to contend with the proposition that "'all statutes will
be considered to have a prospective operation only, unless the legislative intent to
the contrary is clearly expressed or necessarily implied in the language used."144
In dealing with this issue, the majority justified the retroactive application of the
statute because of language in the legislation that "suggests... its purpose" and
which, further indicated that "the Legislature must have recognized the undesir-
ability of prospective application." 145 I thought that the majority's waffling word
choices-"suggests," "must have recognized"-ran afoul of the requirement of
clear legislative intent, and I said so: "Suggested purposes and imputed recogni-
tions are not the clear expressions of legislative intent required by the rule of statu-
tory construction that bases retroactive application of a statute on clear expres-
sions of legislative intent." 14 6 Hopefully, that one sentence captured the essence
of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent.
140. See id. (Lipez, J., dissenting).
141. No other court has cited these dissents in grappling with similar issues.
142. As Justice Brennan has explained, "Dissent for its own sake has no value .... However,
where significant and deeply held disagreement exists, members of the Court have a responsi-
bility to articulate it. This is why, when I dissent, I always say why I am doing so. Simply to say
'I dissent' will not do." Brennan, supra note 3, at 435.
143. 654 A.2d 438 (Me. 1995).
144. Id. at 441 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Fallon, 134 Me. 145, 148, 183 A. 416,
417 (1936)).
145. Id. at 440.
146. Id. at 442 (Lipez, J., dissenting). The statute at issue, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6111
(West 1993), required that mortgagors notify private residential mortgagees of their right to cure
a default before instituting foreclosure proceedings. The parties in Sinclair disputed whether
section 6111 applied to mortgages executed before its effective date. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 654
A.2d at 438. The majority concluded that it did, despite the statute's silence on the subject,
because retroactive application was consistent with its legislative purpose of "protect[ing]
homeowners from noncommercial lenders that are not otherwise subject to regulation." Id. at
442.
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This technique of quoting the majority opinion in the dissent is particularly
important in framing the debate in federal cases, where the decisions tend to be
much longer than the state court opinions. Working through all of those pages, the
reader who finally gets to the dissent can easily forget what all of the fuss is about.
For example, in Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute, 147 the issue was
whether a "private" high school funded substantially by a public school district
was a state actor for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when it suspended one of its students for seventeen days. 14 8 The state actor
determination required the consideration of many factors. To try to explain how I
differed from the majority in the analysis of these factors, I would frequently state
the majority position before citing my own. This paragraph was typical:
When discussing the burdens imposed by state actor status, the majority recog-
nizes the interests of contract schools in avoiding the "rigidities [and] lawsuits"
that accompany state actor status. Given the increasing levels of violence plagu-
ing schools today, I agree that we must respect the school administrators' disci-
plinary prerogatives. However, we do not have to exempt a school such as MCI
from all constitutional standards to advance that goal. Instead, we can respect
those prerogatives within a constitutional framework. 149
Similarly, in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly,150 the issue was whether a Massachu-
setts statute requiring tobacco companies to disclose constituent ingredients of
their products was a facially unconstitutional taking of their property, or whether it
deprived them of that property without due process of law. In dissenting from the
majority's conclusion that the state's disclosure act constituted a regulatory taking,
I referred repeatedly to the positions taken by the majority before stating my con-
trary view. This exchange was typical:
Notwithstanding the express terms of the Act, [the lead opinion] proceeds on the
assumption that Massachusetts necessarily will disclose the tobacco companies'
entire ingredient lists. [It] justifies that assumption by reference to the district
court's opinion, stating that "[a] prior holding, which is not currently before us,
decided that under [the Disclosure Act], Massachusetts will publish the tobacco
companies' ingredient lists." The district court decided no such thing. 15 1
Although these pointed exchanges leave no doubt about the essence of the
disagreement between the majority and the dissenting opinions, they can create an
unpleasant tone and impair collegiality. Wary of these costs, I have sometimes
adopted an alternative strategy for highlighting my disagreements with the major-
ity. Not surprisingly, the majority opinion frequently reflects the positions taken
by the winning party in its brief. Therefore, I have cited the arguments of the
prevailing party in my dissents as the basis for a response, thereby avoiding a
direct confrontation with the majority. This approach produces a more civil tone
without necessarily sacrificing clarity on the points of disagreement. However,
there is something artificial about this studied indifference to the language of the
majority, and I do not generally favor this indirect approach. With sensitivity to
147. 296 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2002).
148. Id. at 26-31.
149. Id. at 41 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
150. 312 F.3d 24 (lst Cir. 2002) (en banc).
151. Id. at 54 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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the power of language to offend, I think you can engage in a direct exchange with
the majority without being uncivil.
The beginnings and endings of dissents are particularly important moments in
framing the debate with the majority. The beginning should explain why you are
dissenting; the ending should be a forceful last word. In State v. Stade, 152 a case
involving a Due Process challenge to the conduct of a police officer who had ad-
ministered a drug test to a defendant suspected of operating under the influence,
the majority decided that the officer's conduct ran afoul of the federal Due Process
Clause. 153 Disagreeing, I wrote at the beginning of the dissent that, "I respectfully
dissent because Officer Chandler's conduct did not violate the canons of funda-
mental fairness protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 154 After several pages of analysis, I concluded the dissent with a statement
that echoed its beginning: "Officer Chandler did nothing that constitutes the type
of oppressive and deceptive conduct proscribed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. To hold that such conduct deprives Stade of his rights
'within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-
old principle of due process of law."' 155 Whatever the judgment about the merits
of the competing arguments, the reader surely understood from these sentences the
stakes in this case.
Some dissents require an immersion in mind-numbing factual detail to ex-
plain the disagreement with the majority. Before diving into this detail, the dis-
senter must explain to the reader why the effort is worth it. For example, in Moun-
tain Valley Education Association v. Maine School Administrative District No. 43,156
a case involving a public employer's unilateral implementation of its proposals on
wages and insurance after a protracted labor dispute, I disagreed with the majority's
approval of the employer's conduct and its reading of the Municipal Public Em-
ployees Labor Relations Law. Before getting into the convoluted facts of the ne-
gotiating history of the parties, I tried to capture the full implications of this dis-
pute:
The ease of unilateral implementation by the employer after the exhaustion of the
statutory impasse resolution procedures will be a disincentive to dispute resolu-
tion by the employer during the statutory impasse resolution process. For that
reason the diluted impasse standard approved in this case is contrary to the premise
of the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law and fundamental tenets
of fairness in public sector bargaining. 157
Similarly, in Devoid v. Clair Buick Cadillac, Inc., 158 a case involving the applica-
tion of Maine's Whistleblowers' Protection Act, the trial court and the majority
had denied the employee relief under the Act. 159 Before getting into the statutory
and factual detail required by the dissent, I wrote: "[T]he Court ratifies an errone-
ous construction of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act that needlessly undermines
152. 683 A.2d 164 (Me. 1996).
153. Id. at 166.
154. Id. at 167 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 170 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)).
156. 655 A.2d 348 (Me. 1995).
157. Id. at 355 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
158. 669A.2d 749 (Me. 1996).
159. Id. at 751.
2005]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
the Act's protective purpose." 16 0 A reader who cares about those protections would
understand the stakes at once.
Of course, some cases are simply too complicated for a one or two sentence
distillation of the disagreement. Still, the dissenter has to explain it. In Guardian-
ship of Boyle, 16 1 the majority had decided that the State had the right to authorize
the treatment of an institutionalized patient with psychotropic drugs when the evi-
dence was clear that without such drugs she would almost surely remain institu-
tionalized for the rest of her life. 16 2 The patient, however, had competently stated
her objections to such psychotropic medications. 16 3 The choices in this difficult
case were both problematic. 16 4 Near the end of this dissent, the longest one that I
wrote on the Law Court, I tried to summarize the stakes in this case:
In the final analysis, this case is a contest between competing views of where
Susan Boyle will have a better life. She made the competent decision that she
would have a better life free of the medication she fears even if that decision
means a life inside an institution. The State insists that she should be forced to
take the medication so she can enjoy a better life outside of the institution. This
position elevates deinstitutionalization to a state interest of exaggerated import
and diminishes Boyle's right to be free of unwanted medical treatment that poses
known risks of dangerous side effects. 16 5
Dissents are made for cases where there are no good answers.
X. THE VOICE OF THE DISSENTER
The pleasure of dissent has been noted by many judges. Justice William 0.
Douglas said that "'the right to dissent is the only thing that makes life tolerable
for a judge of an appellate court."' t 16 6 Justice Scalia has been almost as enthusias-
tic about the writing of dissents:
To be able to write an opinion solely for oneself, without the need to accommo-
date, to any degree whatever, the more-or-less-differing views of one's colleagues;
to address precisely the points of law that one considers important and no others;
to express precisely the degree of quibble, or foreboding, or disbelief, or indigna-
tion that one believes the majority's disposition should engender-that is indeed
an unparalleled pleasure. 167
Judge Patricia Wald has also described the liberating effect of writing a dissent:
Far more than in majority opinions, the voice of a single dissenting judge uses
the first person to speculate, make dire predictions, or chastise colleagues who
have gone wrong .... The irate dissenter is apt to begin with some variation on
the theme, "Never in my ten years on the bench have I seen a case as sad as this."
The strategy of personalization in dissent is to separate the dissenter from the
cold, impersonal, authoritarian judges of the majority, who impliedly do not take
160. Id. (Lipez, J., dissenting).
161. 674A.2d 912 (Me. 1996).
162. Id. at915.
163. Id. at913-14.
164. As an indication of the difficulty of the case, this was one of the two dissents I wrote on
the Law Court where I was joined by two of my colleagues. Id. at 915 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 920 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
166. See Scalia, supra note 18, at 42.
167. Id.
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the human condition into account when they mercilessly impose "the law."
A dissent is liberating. No other judge need agree or even be consulted.
Exuberant (or excess) prose is unconstrained. 168
Although there is some excess in this description, there is no question that
writing a dissent offers the freedom of writing in your own voice. Obviously,
when you are writing for a court, you must try to accommodate the concerns and
preferences of your colleagues. There is nothing wrong with that. That is how the
appellate process works. At the same time, that need for accommodation inevita-
bly tempers your writing style. On the Law Court, if a dissent is joined by one or
two colleagues, there is still a need for some accommodation in the writing. On a
court of appeals panel, where you always dissent alone, there is no need for such
accommodation. With that restraint gone, you must rely on your own good judg-
ment to avoid excessive language.
I have tried to avoid exuberant or excess prose in my dissents. Nevertheless,
I have taken some pointed pokes at the majority. All too predictably, I began one
dissent in a workers' compensation case by writing: "This case illustrates once
again that hard cases make bad law." 169 I ended the dissent with a critical jab: "In
short, there is no reason for this Court to ignore a definitional ambiguity by resort-
ing to an undocumented common usage." 170 In a case involving a dispute over the
proper reading of a liquidated damages provision in a contract, I said at the end of
my dissent that my colleagues did not understand the law: "In effect, the court's
approach results in an award of specific performance to the Town under the guise
of liquidated damages. Such an approach reflects a misapprehension of applicable
legal principles." 17 1 In a disagreement over the application of the "piercing the
corporate veil" doctrine, I charged the majority with "rob[bing] the remedy of its
continuing vitality as a deterrent against abuse of the corporate form."'172 In a
dissent about the work of the state tax assessor, I said that my colleagues in the
majority had gone "astray" 173 and that their application of principles of deference
had "clouded the Court's view in this case." 174 Newly arrived on the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, I said that the majority in an affirmative action case had gone
"awry" in its use of precedents. 175 I guess that going "awry" is the federal version
of going "astray."
168. Patricia Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62
U. Cut. REv. 1371, 1412-13 (1995).
169. LaRochelle v. Crest Shoe Co., 655 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Me. 1995) (Lipez, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1248-49 (Lipez, J., dissenting). LaRochelle required us to determine whether the
phrase "pending appeal," as used in ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 104-Al (West 1989), included
the pendency of a motion for findings of fact or was limited to "a period that commences with
the filing of a notice of appeal and ends with a resolution of that appeal." LaRochelle v. Crest
Shoe Co., 655 A.2d at 1247. The majority concluded that the latter was correct "[als a matter of
common usage" and thus that the statute was unambiguous. Id. I believed that the term "pend-
ing" was ambiguous and that the statute's legislative history supported the more expansive read-
ing. Id. at 1248 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
171. Seashore Performing Arts Ctr. v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 676 A.2d 482, 488 (Me.
1996) (Lipez, J., dissenting).
172. Theberge v. Darbro, Inc., 684 A.2d 1298, 1304 (Me. 1996) (Lipez, J., dissenting).
173. Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Town of Moscow, 649 A.2d 320, 326 (Me. 1994) (Lipez, J.,
dissenting).
174. Id. at 328 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
175. Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 833 (1st Cir. 1998) (Lipez, J., dissenting).
2005]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
Although I might have changed some of this language (perhaps charging my
colleagues with "misapplying" legal principles rather than "misapprehending" them
or saying that they had "weakened" remedies rather than "robbing" them of their
vitality), I think on the whole this is tame stuff. I have certainly penned nothing
comparable to this: "The decision of the Majority of the Court in this case has dealt
a staggering blow to the forces of morality, decency and human dignity in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."' 176 Such language does convey "[a] sense of
urgency and of impending doom [that] is almost a sine qua non of the dissenting
voice."' 177 By that standard, my dissents fail the test.
XI. COLLEGIALITY
There is no gainsaying the proposition that dissents are a threat to collegiality
on an appellate court. As my colleague Judge Coffin has put it, dissents (as well as
concurrences) 178 are "ruptures in the cloak of consensus ordinarily worn by colle-
giality. To the extent that separate opinions are deemed necessary by the writers,
to that extent is collegiality diluted." 179 Judge Coffin has warned of the cost to
collegiality of "corrosive language," defined as "the unthinking use of words that
are, in the mind of the reader or listener, so imbued with irritating or pejorative
meaning that rational discussion is likely to be derailed." 180
At the core of the dissent there is anger or disappointment about an unaccept-
able outcome. Without vigilance, that anger or disappointment can produce lan-
guage that may satisfy some expressive need of the dissenter but that may, at the
same time, offend colleagues; hence, the importance of that convention so often
found at the beginning or end of dissents-"I respectfully dissent." Lest that lan-
176. Commonwealth v. Robin, 218 A.2d 546, 547 (Pa. 1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
The "staggering blow" that Justice Musmanno referred to was the majority's decision that Penn-
sylvania could not constitutionally enjoin circulation of the book Tropic of Cancer pursuant to
its obscenity statute. Id. at 547.
177. Wald, supra note 168, at 1413.
178. Indeed, concurrences do raise some of the same issues as dissents. Justice Scalia equates
dissents with "genuine concurrences," described as "separate writings that disagree with the
grounds upon which the court has rested its decision, or that disagree with the court's omission
of a ground which the concurring judge considers central." Scalia, supra note 18, at 33. 1 wrote
four concurrences on the Law Court and have written eleven on the court of appeals. Of those,
only three or four might meet Justice Scalia's definition of a genuine concurrence. However,
they also do not meet Justice Scalia's definition of concurring opinions that abuse the tradition
of separate opinions-namely, "separate concurrences that are written only to say the same
thing better than the court has done, or, worse still, to display the intensity of the concurring
judge's feeling on the issue before the court." Id. Instead, I have usually written concurrences
because I wanted to convey a perspective on the case not set forth in the majority opinion, or
because I wanted to promote some rethinking on an issue that might recur in a future case. For
example, in Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. v, Capital Terminal Co., 391 F.3d 312 (1st Cir.
2004), a case involving the doctrine of judicial notice of law, I wrote at some length on changes
taking place in the application of that doctrine in the "hope that the discussion will inform the
judicial notice of law analysis when comparable judicial notice of law issues arise in future
cases." Id. at 321 (Lipez, J., concurring). Such a concurrence meets one of Judge Coffin's
justifications for a concurrence-"When a judge wishes to expand the majority's reasoning on a
particular point, e.g., the judge wishes to drive home a point to the bar or the trial courts ......
COFFIN, supra note 120, at 227. Perhaps, in time, I will write a sequel to this article called "Some
Reflections on Concurrences."
179. COFFN, supra note 120, at 224.
180. ld. at 219.
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guage seem ironic, the dissenter must remember that the words used must match
the respect professed.181
Still, even with the use of language that gives no offense, the very fact of a
dissent will give some. It is only human to dislike being challenged in your views.
A dissent is a direct challenge in the public arena where judgments will be made
about who has the best of the arguments. The competitive juices inevitably flow.
Also, dissents delay the issuance of opinions and they make more work for the
judges in the majority, who may feel the need to respond. This recognition-that
dissents inconvenience your colleagues-adds to the pressure of writing a dissent.
As I alluded to earlier, 182 on both the Law Court and the court of appeals, there is
an unwritten rule that if you are going to dissent, you must give that dissent prior-
ity over your own opinions in the cases assigned to you. You do not turn to the
dissent when you "can get around to it." You get around to it now or you do not
dissent. This obligation is highly disruptive of your own work, particularly if the
dissent involves a large record which must be examined before writing. I have
learned from hard experience that I should never promise a dissent within a par-
ticular time frame. My estimates have always been woefully wrong. Although
colleagues will not send you memos telling you to hurry up, you know that they
are thinking about it. They dislike the delay and you dislike the pressure.
In short, there are always collegiality costs in dissenting. Thus, Judge Coffin's
advice should be heeded: "[W]e judges are well advised to resist the temptation
[to dissent] unless we find a compelling interest and no more effective alterna-
tive." 183 As I now acknowledge, 18 4 a few of my dissents (caring about herring?)
have not met this compelling interest standard.
XII. VINDICATION
It is the conceit of most dissenters that, sooner or later, their views will be-
come the law. To test the validity of this conceit in my own dissents, I checked the
record. It was a sobering experience. As noted, I wrote twenty-four dissents dur-
ing my almost four years on the Law Court. To date, I have written fifteen dissents
on the First Circuit. The majority of these dissents (twenty-eight) have not been
cited in any other opinions. Several have simply been cited for basic propositions
of law. 185 A few others have been cited for my summary of the majority's hold-
181. Readers are so familiar with this convention that its omission can be particularly telling.
It was universally noted that Justice Ginsberg never used the word "respectfully" in her dissent
in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 135-44 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See Linda Greenhouse,
Bush v. Gore: A special report; Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
20, 2001, atA1.
182. See supra Part IV.
183. CoFFIN, supra note 120, at 227.
184. See supra Part VIII.
185. E.g., United States v. Lawlor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85 (D. Me. 2004) (citing my dissent in
United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 72 (1st Cir. 2004), for the proposition that absent exi-
gent circumstances, police must have a warrant to search a person's home); Malicki v. Doe, 814
So. 2d 347, 357 n.7 (Fla. 2002) (citing my dissent in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of
Portland, 1997 ME 63 16, 692 A.2d 441,446-47, for the assertion that the Supreme Court has
offered little guidance on whether the First Amendment bars negligence claims against religious
institutions).
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ing.186 The substantive reasoning in a dissent attracted the attention of other judges
in only three cases. In two of those, the attention it captured was that of my own
colleagues who then voted for en banc review. 187 This is not a reassuring record.
I hope that dissents, like good wine, become better with age.
My dissent in Laro v. New Hampshire188 offers some reason for hope. That
case involved a provision of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) creating a
private cause of action against the State for money damages for a violation of the
personal medical leave provision of the Act. 189 Anticipating how the Supreme
Court would apply its precedents from Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 190 and
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,19 1 the majority con-
cluded that Congress's abrogation of state sovereign immunity in the FMLA vio-
lated the Eleventh Amendment. 192 I disagreed. Those cases involved legislation
requiring states to alter age and disability related practices that, under rational
basis review, would not be adjudged constitutional violations under Section.One
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 3 The FMLA, by contrast, addressed gender dis-
crimination. 194 As I pointed out in my dissent, state actions involving gender
discrimination are subject to heightened scrutiny, not rational basis review. 195 In
applying the Supreme Court's congruence and proportionality test to the FMLA's
prophylactic scheme and the legislative record supporting it, I felt that the height-
ened scrutiny standard "require[d] greater deference to congressional action ad-
dressing gender discrimination."'196 For that reason, I concluded that Congress
186. E.g., Smith v. Heritage Salmon, Inc., 180 F Supp. 2d 208,217 (D. Me. 2002) (citing my
dissent in Devoid v. Clair Buick Cadillac, Inc., 669 A.2d 749,750-51 (Me. 1996), to explain that"according to the Law Court, an employee who refuses to obey an order from his employer
because he believes it to be illegal, and who tells his employer as much, is not deemed to have
reported the illegality").
187. See United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'den banc, 385 F.3d
793 (1st Cir. 2004); Ellsworth v. Warden, 318 F.3d 285 (1st Cir. 2003), rev'den banc, 333 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 2003).
188. 259 F.3d 1, 17 (st Cir. 2001) (Lipez, J., dissenting).
189. In Laro, a state employee was terminated while on a medical leave of absence under the
FMLA. Id. at 4. He sued the State for monetary damages, claiming that it violated the Act "by
terminating his employment before the expiration of the twelve week period of unpaid leave
guaranteed under the FMLA." Id. at 5. Upon the State's motion, the district court dismissed the
suit on the grounds that the State was immune to suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Id. Laro appealed, asserting that the personal medical leave provisions of the FMLA
properly abrogated the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 4, 13.
190. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
191. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
192. Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 E3d at 4.
193. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
194. Congress enacted the FMLA to "minimize[] the potential for employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available for eligible medical reasons
(including maternity-related disability) and for compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral
basis; and to promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women and men." 29
U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4)-(5)(1999).
195. Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d at 17 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 17-18 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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had properly exercised its Section Five authority under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 197 in abrogating the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity in the FMLA. 198
In a 2003 decision in the Tenth Circuit, Brockman v. Wyoming Department of Fam-
ily Services,199 the panel acknowledged that I had made a "colorable argument to
the effect that the self-care provision of the FMLA must be viewed as part of the
Act as a whole, and that it would therefore be a valid abrogation of states' sover-
eign immunity."'20 0 However, the Tenth Circuit "decline[d] to adopt that view,"
persuaded by the Laro majority's position that the FMLA's legislative history did
not adequately connect the personal medical leave provision to the prevention of
gender discrimination.20 1
But there is more to this story. In the 2003 case of Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs,202 the United States Supreme Court, in a decision
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, took exactly the position that I had advocated
in my dissent in Laro on the significance of gender discrimination. The Court
distinguished Garrett and Kimel on the grounds that they had involved age or dis-
ability-based discrimination, whereas in the FMLA, "Congress directed its atten-
tion to state gender discrimination, which triggers a heightened level of scrutiny.
Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based
classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test ... it was easier
for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations." 20 3 Although my
dissent (somewhat disappointingly) was not cited in Chief Justice Rehnquist's de-
cision, I could indulge the fantasy that one of the Supreme Court justices or, more
likely, a law clerk, had at least read my dissent in working on the Supreme Court's
opinion.204
I draw a valuable lesson from this experience. Anticipating what the Supreme
Court might do in an area of genuine uncertainty is a dangerous business. If you
draw the good faith conclusion that the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the op-
197. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5.
198. Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d at 24 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
199. 342 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2003).
200. Id. at 1164.
201. Id. at 1164-65.
202. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
203. Id. at 736 (citation omitted).
204. While the Court did vindicate my position that statutes abrogating state immunity under
Congress's Section 5 power to reduce gender discrimination should be analyzed differently than
the statutes at issue in Garrett and Kimel, it did so in considering a different subsection of the
FMLA than we had before us in Laro. Hibbs involved a challenge to an FMLA provision that
entitled employees to take unpaid leave for the onset of a "serious health condition" in a spouse,
child or parent. Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
2612(a)(1)(C) (1999)). The majority's analysis focused specifically on the connection between
that provision and evidence of discrimination resulting from the assumption that women are
overwhelmingly responsible for caring for ailing family members. Id. at 736-38. That reason-
ing may not apply as directly in the personal medical leave context we confronted in Laro. See
Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d at 9 n.6. Hibbs therefore left open the question of whether the
FMLA's personal medical leave provision is constitutional. See Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 740.
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tion that you think is the better one, you are free to choose it. You might just be
right.205
XIII. CONCLUSION
These are some of the hard facts about dissents. They are self-assigned bur-
dens that greatly increase a judge's already heavy load of writing assignments.
They must be written quickly because they affect the ability of colleagues to finish
their own work. They inevitably strain relations with colleagues even if the lan-
guage of the dissent is temperate. A dissent usually "brings no hope of present
reward or vindication."'206 To court-watchers, a dissent may seem an undisci-
plined act of judicial egotism. Worst of all, since dissents have no precedential
value, they may not be read by anyone.
So why write a dissent? Drawing on pop psychology, I think there are unac-
ceptable personal costs to a judge who always buries disagreements just to "go
with the flow." Self-respect suffers from too much silence. To be sure, the para-
dox noted by Justice Brennan-the Court "is at once the whole and its constituent
parts" 207-means that every disagreement does not require or justify a dissent. In
our precedent-bound system, some cases will rarely be precedents because the
outcome of the case is so fact-driven. In these cases, when judges disagree over
the reading of contract language, the sufficiency of the evidence, or the exercise of
discretion in an evidentiary ruling, there is seldom a good reason to dissent. Is
there compromise in remaining silent when you disagree with the outcome in such
cases? Yes. Is your vote in such cases an inaccurate reflection of your true views
about the case? Yes. Is your vote in those cases an abdication of your judicial
responsibility? No. Your obligations as a judge also extend to the court as an
institution, and your concerns about the effect on the court of improvident dissents
are legitimate.
The calculus changes dramatically, however, when your disagreements with
your colleagues involve issues of law that will have reverberations far beyond the
immediate case. Applying the generalities of the Constitution, interpreting stat-
utes of broad applicability, articulating standards of conduct for individuals, busi-
nesses and professions, deciding the kinds of injuries that are compensable-these
are decisions that affect how we all relate to our government, and how we all lead
our daily lives. In these cases, where the stakes are so great, there is a duty to
dissent.
205. 1 remember well the internal debate that I had with myself while working on this dissent.
The direction that the Supreme Court had taken in its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence seemed
almost inexorable. The distinction between the application of that jurisprudence to rational
basis review and heightened scrutiny review had been noted primarily in academic journals. See
Laro v. New Hamphire, 259 F.3d at 20 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (citing Brian Ray, Note, "Out the
Window"? Prospects for the EPA and the FMLA after Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 61
OIo ST. L.J. 1755, 1783 (2000)). Although the distinction was sensible, I thought it was prob-
ably wishful thinking. To her everlasting credit, one of my law clerks at the time, Rosemary
Quigley, persuaded me with a mix of logic and passion that the Supreme Court might just buy
this sensible distinction, and a strong dissent from a court of appeals judge could help. I like to
think that it did. Sadly, Rosemary passed away last year after a lifelong struggle with cystic
fibrosis. She was a remarkable woman, and I will always be grateful for the opportunity to work
with her.
206. Wald, supra note 168, at 1412.
207. Brennan, supra note 3, at 432.
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This reference to duty is a recurring theme in the literature on dissents, where
it is explained in institutional terms. Justice Brennan sees the process of dissent-
ing as enhancing the legitimacy of an appellate court:
[W]hen I dissent, I always say why I am doing so.
Courts derive legal principles, and have a duty to explain why and how a
given rule has come to be.... The integrity of the process through which a rule is
forged and fashioned is as important as the result itself; if it were not, the legiti-
macy of the rule would be doubtful. Dissents contribute to the integrity of the
process, not only by directing attention to perceived difficulties with the majority's
opinion, but,. . . also by contributing to the marketplace of competing ideas.208
I think Justice Brennan is exactly right. Far from undermining respect for the
courts, a dissent signals the difficulties of the issues before the judges and portrays
their collective efforts to find answers in the body of law before them. The fact of
disagreement does not taint the outcome or the process. To the contrary, it reas-
sures the public that each judge on a court takes seriously his or her responsibility
to decide the case correctly.
Even so, dissenting judges do not get good grades just for doing their job. The
majority opinion will be read because, for better or worse, it is the law. Dissents,
on the other hand, "need not be read after the date of their issuance. They will not
be cited, and will not be remembered, unless some quality of thought or of expres-
sion commends them to later generations." 20 9 With due deference to the demands
of collegiality, you must convey the anger or disappointment at the core of every
dissent of any value. Therein lies the great challenge of the dissent-to convince
the reader of both the rightness and large consequence of your position without
resorting to overheated language.
In his 1896 dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,2 10 the first Justice John Harlan
wrote:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Consti-
tution is color-blind .... In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before
the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as
man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.
The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked to-
gether, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall
not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law.2 11
With this restrained but eloquent language, Justice Harlan indicted the majority's
misguided vision of the Constitution, prophesied the harm that would follow from
208. Id. (emphasis omitted).
209. Scalia, supra note 18, at 42.
210. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
211. Id. at 559-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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this linkage of law and racial separation, and planted the seeds for his vindication
in Brown v. Board of Education.2 12
To be sure, most dissents do not involve such momentous issues. But even
when the stakes are smaller, the loss of the debate does not preclude the possibility
that a future case will turn out differently because of the seeds that you have planted.
If that day comes, it may provide a fairer measure of the value of your dissent.
For now, in the absence of such vindication, I must leave it to others to make
judgments about the value or quality of the dissents that I have written. I only
know that these reflections, and the preparations for them, will force me to ask
myself harder questions about when I should dissent and how I should do it. In
that sense, writing this article has been instructive for me. I hope that is also true
for the reader.
212. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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